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Preface 
In June 2001, at the United Nations General Assembly Special Session on HIV/AIDS 
(UNGASS), 189 national governments agreed to the Declaration of Commitment on HIV/
AIDS (DoC). The document commits governments to improve their responses to their 
domestic AIDS epidemics and sets targets for AIDS-related financing, policy, and program-
ming. 
The DoC also stipulates that governments conduct periodic reviews to assess their 
progress toward meeting their UNGASS commitments. In recognition of the crucial role 
that civil society plays in the response to HIV/AIDS, the DoC calls on governments to 
include members of civil society, particularly people living with HIV/AIDS, in the review 
process. 
Established by the Open Society Institute (OSI) in 2004, Public Health Watch sup-
ports the independent monitoring of governmental compliance with the UNGASS DoC and 
other regional and international commitments on HIV/AIDS. It aims to promote informed 
civil society engagement in policymaking on HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis (TB)—two closely 
linked diseases that lead to millions of preventable deaths annually. To this end, Public 
Health Watch also supports the monitoring of TB and TB/HIV policies by civil society, 
examining compliance with the Amsterdam Declaration to Stop TB and the World Health 
Organization’s (WHO) Interim Policy on Collaborative TB/HIV Activities. 
Public Health Watch’s methodology incorporates multiple opportunities for dia-
logue and exchange among a broad range of policy actors. Researchers convene an advisory 
group of national HIV/AIDS and TB experts, activists, and policy actors. The researchers 
prepare draft reports based on input from the advisory group, desktop and field research, 
interviews, and site visits. They then organize in-country roundtable meetings to invite 
feedback and critique from policymakers, academics, government officials, representatives 
of affected communities, and other key stakeholders. Finally, Public Health Watch supports 
researchers in conducting targeted advocacy at the domestic and international levels in 
response to report findings and recommendations.
For the HIV/AIDS Monitoring Project, Public Health Watch’s civil society partners 
in Nicaragua, Senegal, Ukraine, the United States, and Vietnam have prepared assessments 
of national HIV/AIDS policies based on a standardized questionnaire, which facilitates the 
structured review of governmental compliance with key elements of the UNGASS DoC. 
To access the reports of the HIV/AIDS Monitoring Project and to learn 
more about Public Health Watch, including the TB Monitoring Project and the TB 
HIV Monitoring and Advocacy Project, please visit www.publichealthwatch.info. 
.
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Executive Summary
During the past five years, the HIV/AIDS epidemic has been spreading more rapidly in 
Nicaragua and is now on its way to creating a public health emergency. The Nicaraguan 
government initially downplayed the magnitude of the situation, however, demonstrating 
a significant lack of political commitment and leadership in implementing measures to 
prevent the spread of the disease and increase access to treatment. 
The government agreed to the Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS (DoC) 
at the 2001 United Nations General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS), but many of the 
commitments remain unfulfilled. For example, in the drafting of the national HIV/AIDS 
strategic plan, the government did not consistently seek or take into account input from civil 
society. It also never constituted a governmental committee for collecting and prosecuting 
HIV/AIDS-related discrimination cases (comité etico nacional), rendering the existing HIV/
AIDS antidiscrimination law largely ineffective. Although the government has taken steps to 
develop prevention campaigns that target specific vulnerable groups, procure antiretroviral 
(ARV) drugs, decentralize access to health services, and train health care workers, these 
efforts have lacked the necessary continuity and depth. 
In recent years, the government has started to demonstrate more concern over the 
spread of HIV/AIDS, for example, by collaborating closely with local and international non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) and by creating a multisectoral agency with the man-
date to support HIV/AIDS control. The government of the newly elected president, Daniel 
Ortega, has likewise shown signs of its willingness to place HIV/AIDS in a more prominent 
position on the national agenda, as evidenced by the recent publication of the much-awaited 
2006–2010 national strategic plan on HIV/AIDS and the national policy for prevention and 
control of sexually transmitted infections (STIs), HIV, and AIDS. Many of the individuals 
from civil society organizations who were interviewed for this report underscored the need 
for additional improvements—such as the development of a legal and regulatory process to 
address HIV/AIDS-related discrimination cases, increased financial resources, and the full 
participation of both governmental and nongovernmental entities in developing and imple-
menting HIV/AIDS policies and programs, as had been stipulated in the national strategic 
plan for the period 1999–2004. 
The government’s recent shift in attitude is encouraging, but Nicaragua must also 
take more incisive, comprehensive, and systematic measures. It has not yet recognized the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic as a national priority. The 2006–2010 national strategic plan does not 
include a mechanism for monitoring and evaluating the country’s progress toward prevent-
ing and controlling HIV/AIDS. It also does not include a centralized strategy or implemen-
tation guidelines to coordinate the multiple national and international efforts, including 
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those of civil society organizations. In addition, the government has yet to conduct a com-
prehensive national HIV-prevalence survey, which would provide reliable data on the extent 
of the spread of HIV.
The development of integrated treatment, care, and support services is also hin-
dered by the country’s centralized health care system and poor infrastructure. Hospitals 
frequently lack the capacity to properly care for people living with HIV/AIDS. Despite an 
initiative to decentralize health care in 2004—by providing specialized treatment centers in 
Managua, León, Chinandega, the South Atlantic Autonomous Region (Región Autónoma del 
Atlántico Sur, or RAAS), and the North Atlantic Autonomous Region (Región Autónoma del 
Atlántico Norte, or RAAN)—health care services remain highly concentrated in the urban 
center of Managua, with serious gaps in coverage in rural areas. 
Furthermore, there is an insufficient number of health care professionals trained 
in HIV/AIDS care. In the public sector, rotation schedules often prevent the successful 
transmission of knowledge among staff, and training programs lack the necessary depth 
and sensitivity to have an impact on health care workers’ attitudes toward people living with 
HIV/AIDS. These conditions, combined with the shortage of basic medical supplies (crucial 
for adherence to biosafety precautions), contribute to widespread discriminatory practices 
among health care providers.
Although there are newly drafted national HIV/AIDS diagnosis, treatment, and 
care protocols, there is not yet a clear implementation strategy that will translate these pro-
tocols into action that will positively impact the lives of people living with HIV/AIDS. 
The range of available prevention services is limited by cultural norms, which 
hinders the development of programs that effectively target high-risk behaviors and mar-
ginalized groups at elevated risk for HIV, such as sex workers and men who have sex with 
men. As a result, prevention campaigns have not succeeded in reducing stigma and dis-
crimination, increasing awareness of the individual’s risk of infection, or effecting positive 
changes in behavior. 
Funding for HIV/AIDS programming comes mainly from international donors, 
whose objectives are, at times, not well coordinated with national priorities. It is critical 
that coordination between international donors and national projects improve in order to 
develop an integrated, multisectoral national strategy that can deliver better outcomes for 
people living with HIV/AIDS and those at high risk of HIV infection. 
Several local organizations have expressed concern about the sustainability of the 
ARV treatment program because of the heavy reliance on external donor support and, in 
particular, on financing from the Global Fund. Despite donor funding and support for Law 
234 (Law on the Promotion, Protection and Defense of Human Rights in the Face of AIDS), 
which stipulates universal access to ARVs, only an estimated small percentage of those in 
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need of ARVs have access to them. HIV/AIDS activists believe that Nicaragua must formu-
late a national HIV/AIDS policy that includes a sound ARV-procurement plan.
Based on the research and consultations conducted for this report, the following 
recommended strategies specify ways in which the government of Nicaragua can improve 
the national response to HIV/AIDS: 
• Strengthen the Nicaraguan Commission to Fight AIDS (CONISIDA) to effectively 
serve as a national coordinating and monitoring body and to allow the meaningful 
participation of civil society in policy processes.
• Improve the epidemiological surveillance system to identify high-risk groups and 
develop programs to effectively target those groups with prevention, treatment, and 
care services.
• Build the capacity of the health care sector to improve the delivery of HIV/AIDS-
related services, including through the development of the infrastructure and the 
training of health care workers.
• Enhance the coordination of HIV and tuberculosis programming to address TB/
HIV coinfection.
• Develop and implement comprehensive communication strategies to target key 
marginalized populations.
• Strengthen legal protection for people living with HIV/AIDS, including by estab-
lishing a committee to collect and prosecute HIV/AIDS-related discrimination 
cases.
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Background
The first case of HIV/AIDS in Nicaragua was not discovered until 1987, much later than 
the first cases appeared in most other Latin American countries. HIV/AIDS prevalence in 
Nicaragua is still relatively low, at 0.2 percent of the population.1 In recent years, however, 
the number of people living with HIV/AIDS has increased at an accelerated pace, and the 
country is now at risk of succumbing to a full-scale HIV/AIDS epidemic, which will have 
devastating economic, social, and political consequences. 
Young people ages 10 to 24 comprise 34 percent of Nicaragua’s population. A high 
percentage of women (28 percent) give birth before the age of 18, indicating an early average 
age for first sexual intercourse.2 The country also has high rates of illiteracy, unemployment, 
and underemployment, and nearly half the population lives below the poverty line.3 In 
addition, Nicaragua is a multiethnic country with significant cultural diversity. These 
demographic and social factors, together with the government’s failure to develop effective 
HIV/AIDS communication and prevention strategies, have had a profound influence on the 
HIV/AIDS epidemiological profile.4 High-risk behaviors, such as unprotected heterosexual 
intercourse among adolescents, are widespread, and people often do not learn their HIV 
status until their conditions have advanced to AIDS, a situation that has contributed to 
exponential increases in HIV-incidence rates.
Incidence and Prevalence of HIV/AIDS
Estimates of the impact of HIV/AIDS in Nicaragua vary greatly. According to official sta-
tistics, as of December 2006, the national prevalence rate was 29.35 per 100,000 people, 
and the national incidence rate was 7.64 per 100,000. The government has not conducted 
a national epidemiological survey, however, so this information is derived principally from 
a limited number of sites, which can mask broader epidemiological trends. The differ-
ence between the government’s prevalence estimates and those of NGOs is significant. The 
National Program for the Prevention and Control of HIV/AIDS and Sexually Transmitted 
Infections (STI) registered a total of 2,450 people living with HIV/AIDS from 1987 to 
December 2006, compared to NGO estimates of more than 17,000 for the same period and 
an estimate of 7,300 from the Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS).5, 6, 7
HIV/AIDS has disproportionately affected people from 20 to 39 years of age—the 
most economically and sexually active sector of the population (Figure 2). As of 2006, the 
majority of diagnosed cases were among men, with a male to female ratio of 2.4:1. This 
recent finding indicates a dramatic increase in infections among women since 1987, when 
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the estimated ratio of male to female cases was 12.5:1. The gap between male and female 
infection rates has closed more rapidly within the adolescent population, which is now 
nearly 1:1 for the 15-to-19 age group (Figure 3). Despite the increasing risk of HIV infection 
for women and the efforts to address gender in public health policies and practices, the 
government has yet to effectively integrate gender issues and HIV/AIDS.
Figure 1. HIV/AIDS Incidence Rates in Nicaragua, 1987–2007* 
Note: * 2007 data are projected from first trimester incidence rates.
Source: National STI/HIV/AIDS surveillance data
 
Sexual intercourse is the primary mode of disease transmission, accounting for 
94 percent of all new cases. Transmission through injecting-drug use results in 2.8 percent 
of cases. Mother-to-child transmission and transmission via contaminated blood products 
account for 3 and 0.2 percent of all diagnoses, respectively (Figure 4). Of all sexual trans-
missions, approximately 76 percent occur through heterosexual intercourse and 14 percent 
through homosexual intercourse. The transmission rate is 10 percent among those who 
engage in bisexual behavior.8
All of these factors—the accelerated spread of the disease, the principally hetero-
sexual mode of transmission among the young and most economically active sector of the 
population, the increasing impact on women, and the large percentage of the population 
who live below the poverty line with little access to health care—create concern that the 
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Figure 2. Cases of HIV/AIDS by Age Group, Nicaragua, 1987–2006 
Source: National STDs/HIV/AIDS surveillance data
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Figure 4. Percentage of Distribution of HIV/AIDS Cases by Mode of Transmission, Nicaragua, 1987–2006 
High-risk Populations
The available HIV/AIDS-prevalence data for high-risk populations—including sex workers, 
prison inmates, and men who have sex with men—are not comprehensive. Small-scale 
studies, however, have revealed increasing prevalence rates among men who have sex with 
men in Managua (from 1.3 percent in 1997 to 9 percent in 2003), signaling the emergence 
of a concentrated epidemic.9 Similarly, in a recent interview published by the Nicaraguan 
newspaper El Nuevo Diario, prison ombudsperson María Auxiliadora Urbina warned that 
there was significant underreporting of HIV/AIDS-infection rates among inmates, which, 
combined with overcrowding, could soon lead to a widespread HIV/AIDS epidemic in the 
national prison system.10 Studies in three urban centers revealed a 1.4 percent infection rate 
among migrant sex workers in the coastal town of Corinto. All sex workers surveyed had 
a high incidence rate of other STIs, and migrant sex workers had an 80 percent chance of 
presenting with two or more STIs, highlighting the heightened risk of HIV exposure for this 
specific subgroup and the need for policies that target them effectively.11
The 2006–2010 national strategic plan identifies several groups who should be 
targeted with HIV-prevention and communication efforts: women, sex workers, migrant 
populations, the prison population, uniformed personnel, adolescents and young people, 
and men who have sex with men. The lack of data quantifying their vulnerability and ana-
lyzing the contributing behavioral and cultural patterns has hindered the development of 
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TB and HIV/AIDS
The incidence rates of tuberculosis (TB) in Nicaragua have declined by 50 percent over 
the ten-year period from 1995 to 2005.12 The accelerated spread of HIV/AIDS could lead 
to a resurgence of the disease, however, and to the development of drug-resistant strains. 
Although the government has taken some early steps in anticipation of this possibility, there 
is little coordination between the country’s TB and HIV/AIDS programs, with recent studies 
indicating that most coinfection cases remain undetected.13
The Health Care System
The country’s total expenditure on health care measured as a percentage of gross domestic 
product (GDP) has been steadily increasing, climbing from 5.7 percent in 1996 to 8.6 per-
cent in 2005.14 The Ministry of Health’s own expenditure on health care, however, has shown 
the opposite trend, declining from 5.4 percent in 1999 to 4.6 percent in 2002.15 
According to a report published by the Center for Information and Advisory 
Services on Health (Centro de Información y Servicios de Asesoría en Salud, or CISAS), the 
decrease in the percentage of the national budget assigned to health care has resulted in 
increased out-of-pocket spending. As a result, an estimated 20 to 30 percent of the popula-
tion is currently without access to health care. The decrease in funding for health care has 
also limited the ability of health care centers to buy basic medical supplies and reagents with 
which to perform HIV diagnostic tests.16 The government has not earmarked a specific por-
tion of the national budget for HIV/AIDS-related expenditures, and national budget reports 
do not include this information. Therefore, it is extremely difficult to determine the extent 
of governmental spending on the prevention and treatment of HIV/AIDS. The estimates 
provided by national HIV/AIDS accounts are approximate, at best.17 
The Nicaraguan health care system is organized into three different levels of care, 
administered through a network of health centers and clinics. Basic health care services 
are provided at the primary level; specialized services at the secondary level; and clinical 
investigation and diagnosis at the tertiary level. The existing primary-care system is limited 
in the development and implementation of comprehensive treatment and care services for 
people living with HIV/AIDS by three major obstacles. 
First, basic medical supplies—such as saline solution and sterile gloves—are in 
short supply, particularly in rural areas. Second, health care services are heavily centralized 
in large urban centers, so people in rural areas must travel long distances to receive diag-
nostic and maintenance tests (such as viral load and CD4 count tests). Given the financial 
burden associated with travel and the fact that private-sector laboratories are expensive, a 
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large portion of the rural population cannot afford reliable care. Finally, there is little com-
munication and coordination among health care providers, and the quality of care varies 
widely from clinic to clinic. For example, José Manuel Espinoza, a medical doctor and the 
HIV/AIDS officer for the United Nation’s Children’s Fund (UNICEF), stressed that poor 
coordination is responsible for the fact that different HIV-detection techniques are employed 
across the country, some of which do meet the current scientific standards.18 
Socioeconomic Aspects of HIV/AIDS
In 1996, the government conducted a macroeconomic study on the socioeconomic impact 
of HIV/AIDS, including its projected impact through the year 2000. In the years since, there 
has been little follow-up to this study, and the analysis of the socioeconomic repercussions of 
HIV/AIDS in the 2006–2010 national strategic plan is based on this outdated assessment. 
In fact, based on the study’s report of low infection rates, the 2001 Reinforced Economic 
Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy (Estrategia Reforzada de Crecimiento Economico 
y Reduccion de la Pobreza, or ERCERP) places the HIV/AIDS epidemic in the category 
of “other less urgent problems.” As a result, national poverty-reduction and development 
policies and programs currently do not include concrete action plans to address the socio-
economic impact of HIV/AIDS, beyond echoing the broad commitment to the prevention 
of the spread of HIV/AIDS and the reversal of infection rates by 2015, as declared in the 
United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).19, 20 
The HIV/AIDS epidemic will likely have a disastrous effect on families in several 
ways—by increasing household expenditures for health care, by preventing the heads of 
households from continuing to work, and, ultimately, by leaving the children of infected 
parents orphaned. NGOs report, however, that scant attention and resources have been 
devoted to analyzing and mitigating the socioeconomic impact of the epidemic at a micro-
economic level.21 Without accurate knowledge of the socioeconomic impact of HIV/AIDS 
and, in particular, its impact on the most affected sectors of the population, the measures 
aimed at reducing such impact will likely remain inadequate and ineffective.
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Political Commitment 
Strong leadership at all levels of society is essential for an effective response 
to the epidemic.
—UNGASS Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS, 
preamble to “Leadership”
Following the inauguration of President Enrique Bolaños in 2001, there had been some 
positive signs of change in official attitudes toward HIV/AIDS. Previous governments had 
downplayed the impact of HIV/AIDS and even endorsed communication campaigns against 
condom use, which associated HIV with sinful behavior.22 The Bolaños government—in part 
due to pressure from HIV/AIDS activists and international groups—slowly started to move 
away from these positions. For example, the government took a number of visible steps to 
recognize and address stigma and discrimination against people living with HIV/AIDS and 
also mandated sex education classes in public schools.23 
Overall, however, the government failed to demonstrate the focused, sustained 
leadership and political vision required to prevent new infections and to provide compre-
hensive care and treatment to people living with HIV/AIDS. HIV-related political speeches 
and activities occurred primarily around World AIDS Day (December 1). Many governmental 
initiatives were never fully implemented, resulting in half-measures of limited efficacy and 
wasted resources. For example, the Ministry of Health failed to carry through on its plans 
to invest in building capacity for surveillance, monitoring, and evaluation by 2006. As a 
result, Nicaragua still lacks a national monitoring infrastructure, which would help the 
government evaluate the implementation of the national strategic plan and provide a guide 
for future policymaking.
Nicaragua has recently published a national policy for the prevention and control 
of STIs and HIV/AIDS, which articulates a long-term plan to control the diseases within a 
broader context of national health, development, and poverty-reduction strategies. Although 
this policy represents a significant step forward in developing a coordinated national 
response to HIV/AIDS, its impact has so far been constrained by a lack of political coher-
ence. According to civil society groups, because the previous opposition government drafted 
the national policy, President Ortega’s new government may be reluctant to disseminate or 
implement it.24 
Similarly, although the development of two successive national strategic plans on 
HIV/AIDS (the first for the period 1999–2004 and the second for the period 2006–2010) 
represents progress, these plans only define broad objectives and do not set out the clear 
implementation guidelines required to mount a coordinated, comprehensive response to 
HIV/AIDS. The national strategic plans assign specific responsibilities to different govern-
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mental agencies, but without a centralized mechanism for monitoring and evaluating their 
overall progress and for coordinating their various responsibilities, it is difficult to hold 
these agencies accountable. 
Some NGOs assert that the government’s principal preoccupation is attracting and 
maintaining international funding. According to these observers, the government spends 
more energy collecting quantitative data to meet the Global Fund’s requirements and goals 
than it does developing a comprehensive national policy. A national policy with clear imple-
mentation plans and targets could, in fact, be monitored over time to draw additional donor 
support. According to Hazel Fonseca, the director of Fundación Xochiquetzal, “The [govern-
ment’s] commitment is almost nonexistent. The Global Fund is tracking the country’s prog-
ress toward meeting certain quantitative goals, but this is not useful, as it is not generating 
political change.”25 A member of the NGO Fundación Nimehuatzin concurred that there is 
very little interest in HIV/AIDS policy on the part of National Assembly deputies.26 In an 
interview with a German media agency, Niels-Arne Katsberg, the regional UNICEF director, 
described as “dangerous” the government’s relaxed attitude toward the spread of HIV/AIDS 
and its refusal to prioritize HIV/AIDS in the country’s political agenda.27
The NGO community believes it is still too early to determine whether the new 
Ortega government will show real commitment to the fight against HIV/AIDS. Some organi-
zations maintain that the executive office’s participation in the upcoming Central American 
Congress on STD/HIV/AIDS (CONCASIDA) will serve as an indicator of the importance 
assigned to HIV/AIDS within the government’s agenda. The new government has taken 
some positive steps, for example, by posting current HIV/AIDS data, analysis, and policies 
on user-friendly websites to increase access to governmental health documents. Although 
improved access to information will likely facilitate civil society’s scrutiny (which, in turn, 
could lead to greater political accountability), much more needs to be done to ensure the 
collection of accurate epidemiological data and the provision of integrated prevention, treat-
ment, care, and support services. 
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Legal Framework
[The law] is mainly administrative rather than coercive, as there are no 
repercussions for people that do not abide by it.
—Member of Nicaraguan Association for People Living with 
HIV/AIDS (Asociación de Nicaragüenses Viviendo con el VIH/SIDA, 
or ASONVIHSIDA)
In 1996, the government adopted Law 238 to protect, promote, and defend human rights 
in the context of the HIV/AIDS epidemic.28 The law provides a progressive legal framework 
for the protection of the rights of people living with HIV/AIDS with regard to prevention, 
nondiscrimination, confidentiality, and access to health care.29 Although the law promises 
much, it has so far delivered little in terms of increased legal protection or access to treat-
ment for people living with HIV/AIDS. For example, Law 238 stipulates the establishment 
of a technical-ethical committee to ensure its proper implementation, but, more than 10 
years after the law’s adoption, the committee has not yet been formed. 
In addition, there is very little awareness of the existence of Law 238. One lawyer, 
who works with people living with HIV/AIDS, maintained that the law is largely unknown, 
even among his colleagues in the legal profession. Moreover, he asserted that cases of dis-
crimination that could be addressed under the law often go unreported, due to the lawyers’ 
fear of breaching client confidentiality, the victims’ fear of stigma associated with reveal-
ing one’s positive HIV status, and the difficulty of finding witnesses willing to testify30 
Members of the Nicaraguan Association for People living with HIV/AIDS (Asociación de 
Nicaragüenses Viviendo con el VIH/SIDA, or ASONVIHSIDA) have remarked that, in prac-
tice, “Law 238 is mainly administrative rather than coercive, as there are no repercussions 
for people that do not abide by it.”31
Public Awareness
Among the general population, awareness of the risk of HIV is low. Some NGOs contend 
that this lack of knowledge is a consequence of earlier government policies, which down-
played the importance of condom use. Ana María Pizarro, director of the NGO Sí Mujer, 
explained during a local newspaper interview that the recent increase in the number of 
infections among women is due in part to the government’s poor prevention efforts and 
to its ongoing negative attitude toward condom use. She also said that the Roman Catholic 
Church still exerts considerable influence over government policy, even though Nicaragua 
is a secular state.32 
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The government has also not widely publicized the commitments that it agreed to 
under the terms of the UNGASS DoC. As a result, public awareness of the DoC is low, even 
among NGOs working on the prevention and care of HIV/AIDS. Some NGO representa-
tives believe that the government’s failure to communicate its international commitments 
is deliberate. “In the long run,” said Fonseca, “[making their commitments public] would 
be inconvenient for the government, since it would lead to increased demands from the 
population.”33
Participation of Civil Society
[People living with HIV/AIDS] are being used so the government can 
claim that it has consulted with civil society groups.
—Member of ASONVIHSIDA
Community participation in the development, implementation, and ongoing evaluation of 
the national response to HIV/AIDS is limited. There need to be enhanced opportunities and 
mechanisms to facilitate civil society participation in assessing and prioritizing the issues 
that need to be addressed, designing appropriate interventions, and monitoring progress. 
Law 238 established the Nicaraguan Commission to Fight AIDS (CONISIDA) 
with the mandate to foster and facilitate coordination among government agencies, NGOs, 
and international organizations.34 The Civil Society National Commission in the Fight 
against AIDS (Comisión Nacional de Lucha Contra el SIDA desde la Sociedad Civil, or 
CNLCSSC) represents civil society concerns within the CONISIDA. Despite this attempt by 
the CONISIDA to create space for civil society participation, several NGOs have indicated 
that, in practice, the participation is not meaningful. Although civil society representatives 
are often called upon to give their opinions regarding official HIV/AIDS policies and initia-
tives, their input is not taken into account or reflected in national policies.35 
For example, the government invited several civil society groups to participate in 
the development of the 2006–2010 national strategic plan. Their participation occurred 
mainly during the initial planning stages, however, with little follow-up. The government did 
not seek broad civil society input on successive drafts of the plan, and the published version 
does not include any strategic goals that articulate the role of NGOs and community groups 
in the national response to HIV/AIDS. 
As a result of these experiences, many civil society groups doubt whether there is 
sufficient political will to support substantive civil society participation in the HIV/AIDS 
policymaking processes. As a member of ASONVIHSIDA said, “People who live with HIV/
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AIDS are convened to validate [the government’s strategies], but in the end their recom-
mendations are not taken into account. These people are being used so the government can 
claim that it has consulted with civil society groups.”36 
Effective civil society participation is further hampered by a lack of clear lead-
ership. The Global Fund Country Coordinating Mechanism (CCM) and the CONISIDA 
have overlapping roles, which has led to conflict rather than cooperation. According to one 
observer, “The CCM controls all the funds. The CONISIDA has the political legitimacy. 
When it comes to leadership roles, this represents a problem.”37 Without strong central lead-
ership to coordinate the various initiatives, projects initiated both by the government and 
the NGOs tend to be one-off efforts. There are few mechanisms to ensure complementarity 
with national policy and to avoid duplication. In an environment in which collaboration and 
the sharing of information are not encouraged or facilitated, there is considerable friction 
among NGOs as they compete for scarce resources and recognition. 
Stigma and Discrimination
Enact, strengthen or enforce, as appropriate, legislation, regulations and 
other measures to eliminate all forms of discrimination against and to 
ensure the full enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental freedoms 
by people living with HIV/AIDS and members of vulnerable groups…and 
develop strategies to combat stigma and social exclusion connected with the 
epidemic.
—UNGASS Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS, Article 58
Surgeons kicked up a fuss when they realized that a patient they had just 
operated on had AIDS. Doctors were also highly alarmed when they found 
HIV-positive patients drinking coffee in the cafeteria commonly used by 
hospital staff.
— Medical Doctor at a Regional Hospital
The stigmatization of people living with HIV/AIDS is widespread, particularly of people in 
marginalized groups, such as sex workers and men who have sex with men. For example, 
60 percent of respondents in a recent survey agreed that “prostitutes with HIV/AIDS asked 
for it because of their bad behavior” and 44 percent believed that “God punishes prostitutes 
and homosexuals for their lifestyle by giving them AIDS.”38 People living with HIV/AIDS 
report that these attitudes often result in discriminatory behaviors, such as breaches of 
confidentiality in hospital services and denial of medical treatment.39 
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Although individuals can report discrimination and the violation of other rights to 
the Nicaraguan Center for Human Rights (CENIDH) and the Ombudsman’s Office for the 
Defense of Human Rights, few have actually filed reports.40 The reasons are largely fear of 
retaliation and fear of facing yet more discrimination. These fears are not unfounded. The 
research for this report revealed several instances of discrimination, including discrimina-
tion on the part of relatives, the community, health care personnel, work colleagues, and 
supervisors, among others. 
For example, Ricardo Taylor, MD, explained that “discrimination by health care 
personnel represents the principal source of breaches in patient confidentiality.”41 Another 
doctor said that, “In one case, surgeons kicked up a fuss when they realized that a patient 
they had just operated on had AIDS. Doctors were also highly alarmed when they found 
HIV-positive patients drinking coffee in the cafeteria commonly used by hospital staff. 
Several doctors also failed to attend HIV/AIDS-sensitivity training courses.”42 
Other examples of stigma and discrimination are illegal HIV testing requirements, 
forced disclosure of HIV-positive status in the workplace, and stigma from local communi-
ties. This treatment often leads HIV-positive individuals to remain secluded in their own 
homes for fear of being called sidosos (a derogatory term for people infected with HIV) and 
discourages other individuals from seeking HIV counseling and testing.
Educational institutions also often discriminate against children living with HIV. 
In a recent case, teachers agreed to parents’ demands that a HIV-positive girl be forbidden 
to share the same classroom with uninfected children. Commenting on this case, Arelys 
Cano, president of ASONVIHSIDA, said, “Personnel working at public and private institu-
tions are not provided with adequate education and sensitivity training on HIV/AIDS. We 
are extremely worried because, given the number of infected children, [this] is likely not an 
isolated case [of discrimination].” Rafael Ruiz, the municipal representative of the Ministry 
of Education, admitted that teacher training about HIV/AIDS is insufficient and said that 
this case “should serve as precedent to foster the development of initiatives to train teachers 
on HIV/AIDS issues.”43 
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HIV/AIDS Policy 
Ensure the development and implementation of multisectoral national 
strategies and financing plans for combating HIV/AIDS that address the 
epidemic in forthright terms. …  
—UNGASS Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS, Article 37
The CONISIDA was established in 1996 through Law 238 in order to facilitate multisec-
toral coordination on HIV/AIDS, including coordination with international organizations 
and civil society. To date, however, the CONISIDA has not been effective in its role, in part 
because the national strategic plan lacks specific guidelines for implementation and does 
not articulate reporting lines. Several NGO representatives have indicated that it is not 
clear to them what the CONISIDA is supposed to coordinate and what specific function it 
actually serves. 
As a result of this lack of coordination, government and NGO HIV/AIDS activities 
are not effectively integrated into a cohesive national response. Interventions often cover 
the same territories and/or populations, which wastes resources and limits their efficacy. 
Similarly, the lack of a national coordination strategy means the initiatives of international 
donors are not always in line with the national priorities identified in the national strategic 
plan. Because the government relies heavily on donor funding, however, it has little leverage 
to negotiate for specific programs or the terms of disbursement.44 
Policy Administration
Experts have called repeatedly for better coordination of international programming with 
the national structures and policy priorities, which, in turn, should reflect UNGASS com-
mitments and promote multisectoral participation. According to these experts, the estab-
lishment of a national forum for donor coordination on HIV/AIDS, with the support of the 
Secretariat for Social Integration of Central America (Secretaría de Integración Social de 
Centro América, or SISCA) and other regional entities, would facilitate this coordination of 
efforts.45, 46 In addition, a stronger CONISIDA, with a clearly defined role and responsibili-
ties for monitoring and evaluation, could play a key role in coordinating the now-diffuse civil 
society, governmental, and intergovernmental efforts and in ensuring the effective imple-
mentation of the objectives of the national strategic plan. 
Information about the government’s current allocation of the national health 
budget to HIV/AIDS—and the specific categories of HIV/AIDS spending—is not publicly 
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available.47 Despite this lack of information, it is clear that the resources available for the 
control of HIV/AIDS in Nicaragua (and, in particular, for the purchase of ARVs) derive 
almost entirely from external sources.48 As noted previously, these resources sometimes flow 
to projects that are not in line with the goals of the national strategic plan. They are also 
often distributed through parallel administrative structures that bypass rather than reinforce 
domestic decision making.49 For example, the CCM, which was established to oversee the 
development of Global Fund proposals and to allocate those resources, has not worked in 
concert with the CONISIDA. 
Representatives of several national NGOs have said that the availability of foreign 
aid, although crucial in generating greater governmental interest in the issue of HIV/AIDS, 
has paradoxically also allowed the national government to renege on its duties to guarantee 
universal medical care, as set forth in the constitution. The absence of standardized national 
protocols, the limited technical capacity for HIV/AIDS diagnosis and treatment, and the lack 
of a national strategy for training health care staff have also hindered the effective coordina-
tion of the HIV/AIDS-related activities of the Ministry of Health, NGOs, and private health 
providers.50 Clinical capacity is highly centralized, and rural populations experience serious 
gaps in access to medical services. According to José Ramón Espinoza, MD, “[Hospitals] 
are working according to their own capacity to offer services and not taking into account 
whether this level of services meets demand.”51 
At the national level, only the Roberto Calderón and the Berta Calderón hospitals 
in Managua have an infectious disease team that is capable of monitoring patients’ response 
to HIV/AIDS treatment. As a result, some patients must travel to the capital city to receive 
medical care. This condition not only places a great financial burden on those who can afford 
to make the trip, but also means that those who cannot afford it have no access to health 
care. The government recently began decentralizing health care services. Although it is still 
too early to assess the effectiveness of this process, data from select rural areas that have 
been targeted for decentralized access indicate that the impact has been minimal.
Like many other regional and local health facilities, San Juan de Dios Hospital, a 
local departmental hospital in Estelí in northern Nicaragua, does not have sufficient capacity 
to provide adequate care to people living with HIV/AIDS. As Gilma Rosa Juarez Quintero, 
MD, the chief of emergency medicine at the hospital, explained, “We are not set up to 
offer counseling services. For example [when people test HIV positive], I send them to the 
Roberto Calderón Hospital where they receive their ARV regimen. Then I monitor their 
treatment. However, all of this is not part of my job description, since I am the head of 
emergency medicine.” 
Quintero also pointed out a number of other limitations, including those created by 
the infrastructure. “[My] hospital does not have diagnostic tools, such as Elisa and Capilus. 
We have to borrow them from the epidemiologist. We also don’t have the capacity to perform 
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diagnostic tests, which are usually sent to the Red Cross or to mobile health clinics.” Health 
care workers find it difficult to comply with recommended best practices in treatment and 
care. Many facilities lack the necessary medicines (ARVs and medicines to prevent oppor-
tunistic infections, or OIs), proper ventilation, and lighting. Some hospitals do not have 
enough gloves for staff to comply with biosafety measures, and some local health clinics do 
not have the facilities to ensure the level of privacy necessary to maintain confidentiality.52 
A 2004 study assessing the incidence of HIV exposure among health care workers 
in the workplace revealed that only 53.3 percent of hospitals complied with existing biosafety 
protocols. Moreover, 40 percent of all health care personnel interviewed had no knowledge 
of existing HIV/AIDS regulations. Only about half reported receiving HIV/AIDS training in 
the workplace. According to the study, most workplace accidents that carried a high-infection 
risk went unreported, and there was often no systematic institutional policy to control risk 
of exposure to HIV. Rather, individual workers were left to manage situations however they 
saw fit. These findings led the authors of the study to conclude that the “national outlook 
was grave.”53
The lack of systematic and sustainable training programs for health care staff treat-
ing HIV/AIDS also hinders effective delivery of services. Current training efforts are spo-
radic, and there has been little evaluation of their impact on the adoption of best practices 
and transfer of knowledge. The Ministry of Health’s training workshops for health care 
workers are not mandatory and lack continuity. As a result, they fail to reach and appropri-
ately train all health care staff. Some NGO representatives contend that this lack of training, 
combined with inadequate hospital infrastructure and poor working conditions, is a major 
reason for the persistent discrimination against people living with HIV/AIDS among health 
care workers. Even the national reference hospital, Roberto Calderón, has failed to develop 
and implement training programs and workshops that would adequately sensitize its staff 
to provide quality HIV/AIDS care.54 
High turnover rates within key governmental health care posts further hamper 
the provision of quality HIV/AIDS care. This lack of stability in the policymaking arena has 
had a negative impact on the government’s ability to learn from experience and build upon 
policies and programs that show good results. One NGO representative noted, “Every five 
years, all of the health department heads are replaced, and everything starts from scratch. 
The Ministry of Health has not gained experience in these past fifteen years. The [HIV/AIDS 
and STI control programs] have not improved due to these high turnover rates, because 
new leadership is likely to establish new strategies and to view previous efforts [by different 
political parties] as useless.”55 
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Public–Private Partnerships
The 2006–2010 national strategic plan encourages public–private collaboration on HIV/
AIDS. Although there is some evidence of increased activity, the level of coordination and 
information sharing between the public and private sectors is still poor.
Private health services have not been integrated effectively into the government’s 
efforts to combat HIV/AIDS. For example, private providers do not send patient information 
to the Ministry of Health, citing concerns about patient privacy. As a result, national HIV 
statistics exclude these patients’ information. Private providers also do not follow a standard 
national protocol or set of guidelines for treatment. In the autonomous regions—with the 
exception of the Central Bilwi Clinic in the RAAN—the government does not exercise quality 
control over the HIV/AIDS services offered by private health care providers. 
Several recent instances of private sector participation in efforts to control HIV/
AIDS provide encouraging signs of increased interest and willingness to collaborate with 
government efforts. For example, the Nicaraguan Private Enterprise Council (Consejo 
Superior de la Empresa Privada en Nicaragua, or COSEP) has begun to incorporate HIV/
AIDS into their meeting agendas.56 It is too soon, however, to determine whether these 
discussions will have an impact on implementation. 
Prevention
Prevention must be the mainstay of our response.
—Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS, preamble to “Prevention” 
The 2006–2010 National Strategic Plan on HIV/AIDS identifies 11 priority groups: ado-
lescents, young people, sexually exploited children, child victims of violence, women of 
reproductive age, pregnant women, men who have sex with men, sex workers, mobile popu-
lations, prison inmates, and prison employees. To date, not all groups have been targeted 
with prevention efforts, however. The lack of targeted programs stems in part from the 
absence of reliable epidemiological and risk behavior data on specific populations. There is 
no such information available for mobile populations, and the data are incomplete for all 
other groups. 
There are no government prevention campaigns designed for sex workers or 
for men who have sex with men, which is troubling given the relatively high prevalence 
rates among these groups.57 Orphans and sexually exploited children have been similarly 
neglected. Prevention programs do not yet target mobile populations and prison inmates, 
although the government has conducted background research on these groups in order 
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to design effective interventions. The low levels of knowledge among mobile populations 
particularly illustrate the need to reach this group. A 2004 Ministry of State survey of this 
population revealed that only 23 percent of respondents were familiar with one or two forms 
of HIV/AIDS transmission.58 
Existing prevention programs have generally not had real impact on the degree of 
knowledge about or attitudes toward HIV/AIDS. They also have not resulted in measurable 
behavior changes. In addition, HIV prevention efforts do not always follow protocols. For 
example, although HIV tests require informed consent, pretest counseling services are not 
comprehensive and are often either not available or not offered to the patient. 
In 2003, two knowledge, attitude, and practice (KAP) surveys of sex workers and 
men who have sex with men indicated that familiarity with available HIV/AIDS prevention 
strategies had not translated into behavioral changes.59 For example, although the majority of 
sex workers interviewed knew how to prevent HIV/AIDS transmission, only a small percent 
used condoms regularly, particularly in sexual relations with a stable (non-client) partner.60 
Among men who have sex with men, although more than 86 percent knew how to avoid 
infection (including correct condom usage), only about half reported using condoms in their 
last sexual relationship with an occasional partner.61 
A similar study among the national prison population revealed that less than 50 
percent of inmates knew how to prevent sexual transmission of HIV/AIDS and an even 
smaller percentage reported consistent condom use (19.4 percent of men and 16.9 percent 
of women). Almost one-third of those interviewed had never used a condom.62 Promotion of 
condom use is now officially a part of the government’s prevention strategy, but continuing 
opposition to condoms by religious authorities and lingering misconceptions resulting from 
earlier government campaigns that downplayed the magnitude and impact of HIV/AIDS still 
exercise a powerful influence on popular attitudes toward HIV/AIDS. 
Local NGOs play an important role in implementing prevention programs, particu-
larly by targeting marginalized populations. For example, ASONVIHSIDA works to promote 
condom use and positive behavior changes, to decrease stigma and discrimination, and to 
push for better care and treatment of people living with HIV/AIDS.63 The lack of effective 
collaboration among NGOs, however, coupled with the government’s ineffectiveness in coor-
dinating the multiplicity of responses, leads to duplication of efforts in some areas and gaps 
in coverage elsewhere. In addition, the absence of an effective system for monitoring and 
for gathering data prevents the identification and scaling up of successful local strategies 
and the compilation of best practices that would improve current programs. 
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Information, Education, and Communication 
The 1999–2004 national strategic plan identified the development of an information, edu-
cation, and communication (IEC) strategy as one of its eight strategic objectives. A national 
consensus on an IEC strategy is still missing from the 2006–2010 plan, however, highlight-
ing the scant progress made in this area.64 
An effective IEC strategy would provide targeted communication for marginalized 
groups at high risk of HIV infection—such as sex workers, prison inmates, youth, and men 
who have sex with men; other key segments of the population, such as health care workers 
and military and police officers; and socially influential groups, including religious lead-
ers and politicians. A concrete strategy that establishes clear goals and benchmarks and 
identifies agencies responsible for its implementation has not been established, however.65 
In addition, there has been little attempt to systematically assess the impact of current 
HIV/AIDS communication efforts to improve their overall effectiveness.
There have been only a few isolated efforts to disseminate IEC messages targeting 
specific populations. For example, in 1997 a group of NGOs, working under an umbrella 
organization and in collaboration with the Ministry of Health, launched the Together We 
Decide When (Juntos Decidimos Cuándo) campaign. The primary objective of the campaign 
was to reduce unwanted adolescent pregnancies by increasing knowledge about reproductive 
health, postponing the first sexual encounter, and promoting child spacing.66 The campaign 
also had an HIV component—promoting condom use as an effective means of protec-
tion against both unwanted pregnancies and HIV/AIDS and providing general information 
about HIV/AIDS and its prevention. The Ministry of Education and the Ministry of State, 
respectively, have launched two independent campaigns: Education for Life (Educación para 
la Vida), which targets teachers, students, and parents, and Together against AIDS (Juntos 
contra el SIDA), specifically for Ministry of State personnel.67, 68, 69 
Studies evaluating the effectiveness of the Together We Decide When campaign 
revealed that it has had a positive impact. Of those exposed to its messages, 46 percent of the 
men and 33 percent of the women decided to take measures to avoid unwanted pregnancies. 
As a result, condom use among adolescents and youth has increased.70 
With the noted exceptions, current communication efforts target the general popu-
lation and largely fail to take into account the need for differentiated messages and strategies 
to reach high-risk groups. For example, there are no national campaigns currently in prog-
ress to target men who have sex with men, although studies indicate that the prevalence rate 
for this group may be as high as 9 percent. Ethnic minorities, such as migrant populations 
and the Miskito population (predominant in the RAAN), have also been neglected. 
Prevention messages are also frequently out of touch with the realities of Nicaraguan 
society, often advocating abstinence and delay of first sexual relations, even though multiple 
studies and data show that sexual intercourse occurs at a very early age in Nicaragua.71 
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As a result, many youth who cannot or do not choose to practice abstinence remain at high 
risk for HIV infection. Moreover, IEC efforts most often target individual attitudes and 
behaviors, without adequately addressing the broader social context and the societal norms 
that influence those attitudes and behaviors, such as stigma, discrimination, and gender 
inequality. 
Finally, there has been poor coordination of prevention messages among govern-
mental departments. For example, the two autonomous regions (RAAN and RAAS) have 
different communication plans. Whereas the RAAS includes specific marginalized groups 
in its campaign, the RAAN has only implemented campaigns for the general public.72, 73 This 
fact is particularly worrisome given the large ethnic diversity in the RAAN. In particular, 
individuals in the Miskito population may require targeted messages and materials in their 
own language.
Coordinated Health Services
HIV-prevention efforts are not adequately coordinated with other health services, including 
diagnosis and treatment of STIs and TB, family planning, prenatal and neonatal care, drug 
use prevention and treatment, and efforts to address domestic and sexual violence. Major 
obstacles to greater coordination are the absence of national standards for disease diagnosis 
and the dearth of health care workers who can effectively refer patients to other pertinent 
services.
In order to improve coordination between services for HIV/AIDS and TB, the 
Ministry of Health has adopted protocols for the treatment of TB/HIV-coinfected patients.74 
In practice, it has not, however, been able to effectively coordinate TB and HIV/AIDS care, 
due to lack of a centralized coordinating mechanism to train medical staff on coinfection 
treatment protocols and to monitor their compliance. As a result, treatment of coinfected 
patients is not sufficiently responsive to the often complicated and difficult interactions 
between TB and ARV drugs.75 
Poor coordination between the TB and HIV/AIDS programs also contributes to 
the low number of TB patients who undergo HIV testing and the insufficient data on coin-
fection rates (Table 1). For example, the staff of the national TB program (Programa de 
Control de Tuberculosis, or PCT) often do not know whether or not patients under their 
care have been tested for HIV.76 Moreover, local TB control efforts do not always comply 
with national protocols.77 Although the PCT specifies that TB patients between the ages of 15 
and 65 should be routinely tested for HIV, subject to their informed consent, a recent study 
by the National Autonomous University of Nicaragua (Universidad Nacional Autónoma de 
Nicaragua, or UNAN) reported that only a small sample (16.7 percent) of TB patients in six 
municipalities were offered an HIV test.78
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Table 1. TB/HIV coinfection, 1998–2004798
Categories 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
All TB cases 2,604 2,558 2,402 2,448 2,092 2,283 2,220 1,246
HIV cases 62 104 128 164 194 226 376 ND
AIDS cases 30 36 58 74 61 55 ND ND
% TB/HIV coinfection 0.8%80 ND ND ND 2%81 ND 2.4 %82 ND
ND: no data
The number of coinfections detected by the PCT may represent only a small frac-
tion of the actual number of coinfected patients. In 2004, the PCT reported only nine 
coinfection cases. A study carried out by UNAN in 36 municipalities detected a coinfection 
rate of 3.7 percent (5 out of 138 HIV-positive patients also had TB), which, if extrapolated to 
the entire population, would total 82 coinfections. The fact that only a small proportion of 
TB patients are offered an HIV test undoubtedly further contributes to the statistical under-
representation of coinfection rates.83 
According to Guillermo González, MD, a consultant to the Ministry of Health in 
the drafting of the national strategic plan and currently the vice minister of health, “The 
two programs [HIV/AIDS and TB] are designed in a way that undermines cooperation. 
The country’s epidemiological surveillance and monitoring systems are in an embryonic 
stage, and there is very little shared analysis [between the TB and HIV/AIDS programs]. 
The information [on coinfection rates] is there, but it is centralized and not inclusive of all 
segments [of society]. [The information we have] is not timely, not contextualized, and not 
comprehensive, due to our passive approach to case detection.”84 
In its latest annual report, the PCT proposed a number of steps that could be taken 
to improve cooperation with the HIV/AIDS program. Among them was the development 
of a TB/HIV national collaboration plan that would outline joint strategies for the treat-
ment and care of coinfected patients.85 The HIV/AIDS program does not appear to share 
a commitment to address TB/HIV, however. For example, the national strategic plan on 
HIV/AIDS does not include the development of a national TB/HIV national collaboration 
plan as an objective. This lack of a shared commitment to improve detection and treatment 
of coinfection cases is particularly troubling given the rise of multidrug-resistant strains of 
tuberculosis worldwide.
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Treatment 
Make every effort to provide progressively and in a sustainable manner, 
the highest attainable standard of treatment for HIV/AIDS, including the 
prevention and treatment of OIs, and effective use of quality-controlled 
antiretroviral therapy in a careful and monitored manner to improve 
adherence and effectiveness and reduce the risk of developing resistance….
—UNGASS Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS, Article 55
It is a big lie that Nicaragua has universal access to ART [antiretroviral 
therapy].
—René Valverde, the Nicaraguan Red Cross, Chinandega
Nicaragua’s legislation guarantees access to health care—including prevention, treatment, 
and rehabilitation services—and the right to confidentiality, respect, and nondiscrimination. 
This guarantee includes the care and treatment for people living with HIV/AIDS, but taken 
alone, is insufficient in ensuring access to comprehensive, integrated care. 
For example, despite legislation prohibiting discrimination based on HIV status, 
there are frequent violations in the health care sector. Members of ASONVIHSIDA have 
described several instances in which they were denied medical attention after tests revealed 
their HIV-positive status.86 Likewise, national newspapers have published several accounts 
of discrimination in access to hospital treatment. For example, the Nicaraguan Red Cross 
denied emergency ambulatory transport to one young patient because he was HIV-positive 
and presented with blood loss.87
The limited capacity of the health sector, the lack of basic medical supplies, and the 
insufficient number of trained health care workers all represent challenges to widespread 
access to HIV/AIDS-related treatment and care.88 The centralization of medical capacity 
further compounds the problem. As noted, rural populations must travel long distances for 
basic diagnostic and maintenance tests, such as viral load and CD4 count tests, and to access 
other services such as counseling. This circumstance may result in patients receiving ARVs 
without the necessary support and follow-up care to ensure treatment adherence. 
With the purchase and installation of new technology in national laboratories, the 
government has taken some steps to improve access to diagnostic and maintenance tests. 
Increased capacity in national laboratories will not likely have an impact on rural commu-
nities, however. It remains to be seen whether these initial steps will be accompanied by a 
more comprehensive campaign to train the needed health care personnel and to ensure the 
availability of basic supplies.
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Antiretroviral Therapy
Although Nicaragua guarantees free access to antiretroviral therapy (ART), it is estimated 
that only 29 percent of all people living with HIV/AIDS currently receive it.89 Despite an 
incipient decentralization process, antiretroviral (ARV) distribution is still centrally managed 
through the infectious disease department at the Roberto Calderón Hospital in Managua, 
which has negative implications for the rural population’s access to ARVs.
As noted, the government relies heavily on donor funding to finance ARV treat-
ment. According to Nicaragua’s latest proposal to the Global Fund, Global Fund resources 
will subsidize approximately 70 percent of all necessary expenses for ARV treatment until 
2012.90 In addition, the Brazilian and Venezuelan governments have pledged to support 
treatment for 200 and 433 individuals, respectively, for the period 2007–2008.91 Given the 
total number of registered cases of HIV and the large estimated number of undetected cases, 
these international contributions are insufficient to guarantee universal access to treatment. 
In the Global Fund proposal, the CCM estimates that current economic resources will leave 
1,820 individuals without access to ARV treatment by the end of 2008 and 2,670 without 
access to treatment by 2012. It remains unclear whether the Nicaraguan government plans 
to earmark funds to ensure access to ARVs for individuals who are not covered by interna-
tional funds.
A number of civil society organizations have echoed these concerns over lack of 
access to ARV therapy. In an interview with Fundación Agua Buena, a Central American 
human rights organization, René Valverde from the Nicaraguan Red Cross in Chinandega 
said, “It is a big lie that Nicaragua has universal access to ART. The Global Fund only [has 
plans to provide] access for one hundred people living with HIV/AIDS per year, a ridiculously 
low amount for Chinandega alone.”92 Other NGOs have had similar experiences regarding 
inadequate access to ART. Of the 143 HIV-positive patients who receive care at Fundación 
Xochiquetzal, only 53 receive ART. The Center for Justice and International Law (CEJIL) and 
the Fundación Agua Buena were forced to file a claim with the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights (IACHR) on behalf of 16 people living with HIV/AIDS who had been 
denied access to ART in violation of both national and international commitments.93
The Ministry of Health maintains that treatment for 25 percent of all patients has 
been subsidized directly by the government and that the remaining 75 percent has been paid 
for by the Global Fund. Several organizations interviewed for this report, however, question 
the veracity of this statement and maintain that the government’s investment in ART is 
much lower—possibly nonexistent. The national health budget for 2006 does not include 
the use of national funds for the purchase of ARVs. Similarly, the proposal to the Global 
Fund does not specify the amount of government funding, if any, that has been earmarked 
for ARV procurement. Instead, the government funding allocated for the purchase of medi-
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cines and reagents is combined with personnel salaries in a single figure for the entire 
2008–2012 period, which makes it impossible to calculate the government’s actual contri-
bution to ARV treatment.94 The lack of a clear, long-term plan to guarantee a sustainable 
national response is of concern, especially considering that current free trade agreements 
could restrict the government’s ability to purchase generic ARVs in the future.95 
Care and Support 
NGOs have spearheaded successful local initiatives in Nicaragua to expand access to care 
and support for people living with HIV/AIDS. The Ministry of Health has also launched 
Stepping Stones, a pilot project that focuses on diagnosing new HIV/AIDS cases and build-
ing and strengthening the care and support capacity of families.96 These initiatives, although 
commendable, are isolated attempts and do not represent an effective national response. As 
is the case in the areas of prevention and treatment, the national response for the care and 
support for people living with HIV/AIDS remains fragmented and insufficient, in need of 
greater political will, better coordination, and additional resources. 
In order to improve the quality of care for people living with HIV/AIDS and their 
families, the government must ramp up training for health care staff, decentralize special-
ized and interdisciplinary medical care, increase the availability of both ARV drugs and 
drugs for the treatment of OIs, and improve levels of social and community support for 
people living with HIV/AIDS, including the availability of home-based care when necessary. 
The lack of a comprehensive and accessible system of care and support can also interfere 
with patients’ adherence to ART. To date, there have not been any studies to evaluate adher-
ence to HIV/AIDS treatment. It is imperative to plan and conduct such studies, particularly 
given the minimal counseling and follow-up support that many people living with HIV/
AIDS in rural areas receive. 
During the past several years, social support for people living with HIV/AIDS has 
increased, due to the reinforcement and expansion of basic governmental food rations, 
greater availability of replacement feeding for children of HIV-positive mothers, and efforts 
to provide home-based care by community activists and local NGOs. The efforts of Atlantic 
Coast community activists are particularly noteworthy. The region’s geographical isolation 
and the resultant lack of access to care has meant that these groups have had to redouble 
their efforts to provide home-based care for people living with HIV/AIDS.97 
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Monitoring and Evaluation
A major obstacle to the effectiveness of efforts to control HIV/AIDS has been the absence 
of a monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system to assess the implementation and efficacy of 
programs. The HIV/AIDS strategic plan monitoring committee, founded in 1999, remained 
inactive until 2004. As a consequence, national performance was evaluated only as the 
1999–2004 national strategic plan period drew to a close. Most of the plan’s stated objec-
tives were never achieved, and progress on implemented activities has not been properly 
documented and so remains largely unknown. 
The national strategic plan for 2006–2010 calls for the development of yearly oper-
ational plans to implement its strategic objectives. The plan lacks, however, a core frame-
work for the M&E system, a designated supervisory body, and a clear budget for monitoring 
and auditing activities. These omissions are likely to lead to disappointing outcomes once 
again. Without a centralized monitoring strategy, it will be difficult to hold implementing 
authorities accountable for progress. The absence of monitoring mechanisms hinders the 
collection and transmission of feedback on the performance of the various strategies and 
interventions, limiting the potential for learning lessons and for developing improvements 
over time. 
The Global Fund has provided financial and technical resources to CONISIDA 
for the monitoring and evaluation of HIV/AIDS initiatives, which has allowed Nicaragua to 
expand M&E coverage to include an evaluation of NGO interventions. The committee that 
carries out civil society monitoring does not include representatives of people living with 
HIV/AIDS, however.98
Since the 1980s, Nicaragua has relied on a HIV/AIDS surveillance system that 
focuses mainly on the gathering of data on rates of infection. The government has recently 
begun to expand the system to include the monitoring of changes in risk behavior, in col-
laboration with international donors and United Nations (UN) agencies. 
The country’s epidemiological surveillance plan, however, still lacks clear guide-
lines to evaluate the success of initiatives to control HIV/AIDS and STIs. It also lacks a 
quality-control system to ensure the reliability of the collected data. Many experts believe that 
the official reports of the rates of HIV/AIDS incidence and prevalence grossly underestimate 
the true extent of the spread of the disease. In addition, the surveillance data are centralized 
in the Ministry of Health, and so are not easily accessible to the public. The data are also 
not fully analyzed to provide stratified data by groups, limiting their usefulness in guiding 
policies and new initiatives. Further, surveys by NGOs and academic institutions have not 
yet been compiled into a single database, which could serve as a reference tool. 
During the past three years, Nicaragua has made an increased investment in build-
ing capacity for surveillance, monitoring and evaluation, and, in particular, the training of 
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Ministry of Health personnel.99 The Country Response Information System (CRIS) devel-
oped by UNAIDS was not widely rolled out in 2006 as originally planned, however. The 
adoption and consistent use of the CRIS, which was developed specifically to assist with 
UNGASS reporting, could have supported national monitoring efforts. Similarly, plans to 
update the national HIV/AIDS database have been pending for several years. 
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Recommendations 
The following recommendations for the government of Nicaragua, based on research and 
consultations conducted for this report, specify strategies that will improve the national 
response to HIV/AIDS. 
• Strengthen CONISIDA to effectively serve as a national coordinating body that 
promotes collaboration among international donors, government, and civil soci-
ety; allows for meaningful civil society participation in policy processes; facili-
tates exchange of knowledge and best practices; and monitors implementation of 
national strategic objectives. 
• Improve the collection and analysis of epidemiological surveillance data to identify 
high-risk groups in order to guide the development of interventions that effectively 
target these groups with prevention, treatment, and care services.
• Build the capacity of the health care sector to improve the delivery of HIV/AIDS-
related services, including through the development of the infrastructure, training 
of health care workers, and more-effective decentralization of health services. 
• Enhance coordination between HIV and TB programming to address TB/HIV 
coinfection, including by adopting and implementing the WHO’s Interim Policy 
on Collaborative TB/HIV Activities, which stipulates the creation of a TB/HIV 
coordinating body, the joint planning of actions, and the increased monitoring of 
HIV/AIDS prevalence among TB patients.
• Develop and implement comprehensive communication strategies to target key 
marginalized populations and groups at high risk for HIV, including by addressing 
the underlying social and cultural factors that influence vulnerability. 
• Strengthen legal protection for people living with HIV/AIDS, including by estab-
lishing a committee to collect and prosecute HIV/AIDS-related discrimination 
cases.
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